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Hegemonic Struggles of the African
National Congress: From Cacophony of 
Morbid Symptoms to Strained Renewal 
Susan Booysen 
Abstract: The contemporary condition of the African National Congress 
(ANC) of South Africa, viewed through the lens of hegemony and by 
means of four sets of correlates of decline and potential renewal, reveals 
an organisation that has turned away from lethal decline, yet by 2018 was 
battling to reconstitute a powerful, united historical bloc to underpin a 
new hegemony. The assessment is executed across the outward fronts of 
the ANC in relation to the people, the state, and elections, and on the 
inward side, the ANC organisationally. The ANC, up to late 2017, had 
undergone a process of hegemonic decline that appeared irreversible. 
Manifold morbid symptoms of hegemonic decline were evident. In late 
2017 the ANC secured a leadership change that held the potential to 
reverse the decline and reinvigorate the ANC’s prospects for hegemonic 
hold, even if at best it would be a long-term, incremental process. Yet, at 
the centre, the organisation remained riven with factionalism that pivot-
ed around power and control over public resources; those entrenched in 
the status quo ante were fighting back, and the new order was struggling 
to emerge. By drawing together these symptoms (correlates) of decline 
and possible reversals, the article synthesises the state of ANC hegemony 
as the movement approaches 25 years in political power. 
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Introduction 
The African National Congress (ANC) once embodied the moral and 
intellectual leadership of South Africa. Its liberation movement creden-
tials helped elevate it to a politically dominant and morally esteemed 
position. It towered over other contestants in the country’s post-1994 
multiparty system. The vast majority of South Africa’s population con-
sented to ANC rule, accepting both the legitimacy of the democratic 
order and the ANC’s electorally dominant position. In recognition and 
representation of collective will, it approximated Gramsci’s Modern 
Prince;1 the ANC had asserted its hegemony, and persistence seemed a 
given. Instead of hegemonic permanency, however, the ANC started 
declining barely a decade after the 1994 moment of liberation and then 
advanced relentlessly downward in the period of ANC and South Afri-
can president Jacob Zuma, from 2007 to 2017. At the time of this ana-
lysis, the ANC had reached a turning point and negotiated the turn, yet 
was struggling to emerge from a cauldron in which multiple morbid 
symptoms of decline battled against tentative signs of renewal. The con-
dition is captured by Gramsci’s (1971: 275–276) depiction of a dying old 
order and a new order struggling to emerge.2  
By late 2017, interrelated outward and inward struggles of the ANC 
had spiralled and hegemonic decline was tangible. The internal symp-
toms of decay were related to ANC organisational integrity and political 
leadership that had failed in many respects. Renewal advanced upon the 
ANC leadership change of December 2017,3 yet many layers of organisa-
tional decay subsequently required turnaround. The ANC problems 
affected the South African state and its ability to govern and transform 
society. The state-institutional problems, driven by entrenched and often 
corrupted factional interests, were severe and resistant to change. Mul-
tiple initiatives to rebase government commenced once the ANC and 
state top leadership changed. Yet at both political and bureaucratic levels 
1 The Modern Prince, in the words of Gramsci (1971: 129), is “an organism; a 
complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been 
recognised and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take con-
crete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political 
party – the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will 
tending to become universal and total.” 
2 Hart’s (2013) South Africa analysis offers a more ideological and class-centred 
approach, while the current analysis is centred on the party and its positioning 
in relation to the people. 
3 The national elective conference was held at the Nasrec exhibition centre, 
Johannesburg, and “Nasrec” came to denote this ANC moment. 
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the demands for rapid change competed with the new leadership’s quest 
to retain organisational unity – and to not alienate the old-order func-
tionaries who were associating only tentatively with the new order. The 
former liberation movement’s relationship to the people of South Africa 
had changed. Evidence of discontent had started accumulating as the 
ANC peaked electorally in 2004 (see Hamill 2010; Lodge 2004). What 
seemed at first to be a gradual decline was aggravated by party split-offs 
and then combustible factional struggles for control over the ANC. 
These struggles moved to centre stage from 2014 to 2017. Again, tenta-
tive but strained changes revealed themselves upon leadership change 
and the promise of a new ANC order. 
These changing configurations of the ANC’s hegemonic position 
were reflected on the fronts of direct engagements between the govern-
ing party and the people, through elections, and via the state’s often-
compromised capacity (see Booysen 2011). These were the first three 
fronts external to the ANC organisationally along which the ANC’s 
current struggle to retain the consent of the people was unfolding. The 
fourth front, representing the internal site of hegemonic struggle, was the 
ANC organisation itself, which had become the site of a factional strug-
gle for control over the ANC: the two predominant factions were the 
Zumaists, who were associated with former presidential incumbent Ja-
cob Zuma and his associate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (seemingly in 
continuous ascendance, but then defeated), and the Cyril Ramaphosa 
faction that emerged narrowly victorious at the 2017 ANC elective con-
ference. Both used the personalised mechanism of leadership and select 
ideological positioning in their quests to become the dominant force 
within the ANC and leader of all of society.  
The dialectical nature of the ANC’s internal and external struggles 
to retain hegemony shapes this analysis, which focuses both on the de-
cline and on the ANC factions’ reticent turnaround actions. This article 
argues that the ANC has been undergoing a prolonged phase of gradual 
hegemonic decline, occurring on a jagged curve, but with a potential 
concentrated upward movement should the Ramaphosa camp consoli-
date the renewal in state and party. In the first part of this process, char-
acterised by decline, the intersecting internal–external struggles rein-
forced the ANC’s increasing distance from the people. Popular 
scepticism and despondency arose on the back of unfulfilled expecta-
tions over time and malfunctions in policymaking and implementation in 
party and government; these sentiments were further stoked by percep-
tions of internal and external state capture and corruption that impaired 
better performance. The internal ANC leadership contests became 
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paired with control over state resources for individual benefit (see Pauw 
2017; PARI 2017), quests that were veiled in ideological terms of feigned 
radicalism, nationalism, and the foregrounding of incomplete colonial 
struggles. The essential difference between the factions was the Rama-
phosaists’ stress on a less corrupt government, while the Zumaists veiled 
corruption under the cover of radical rhetoric. Ramaphosa was clearly 
linked to domestic and global capital, yet also to social democracy and 
the ANC’s variants of radicalism; Zuma was linked to a personalised 
network of arriviste capital. 
To justify its own failures, the Zumaist ANC demeaned the organi-
sation’s negotiated political revolution of 1994: the Apartheid and colo-
nial pasts, it argued, remained responsible for South Africa’s morose 
present. Using Joseph Femia’s (1981, in Moore 1995: 48) notion of min-
imal hegemony,4 it is clear that the divided, factional ANC by late 2017 
was not exercising even this marginal form of hegemony, had incomplete 
command of its popular base, and therefore had a compromised ability 
to exercise societal hegemony. 
The antitheses to these arguments and conditions advanced by the 
opposing, tentatively ascendant faction that rose to power under Rama-
phosa included the more liberal nostrums of constitutionalism and clean 
government, restoration of ANC values,5 and the amplification of estab-
lished ANC policies. In most instances, such elaborated ANC policies 
would be equal in outcome to the effects of the radicalism that had been 
claimed by the Zumaists. The policy-ideological result that emerged from 
the ANC’s 2017 conference deliberations was a commitment to “radical 
economic transformation” that amounted to mild amplifications of pre-
vailing policy with elevated radical rhetoric (ANC 2018).  
The aim of this analysis is therefore to unpack the nature of the 
ANC’s condition of declining hegemony and assess the possibilities of 
consolidating a reversal. The study is interpretative, drawing on cumula-
tive research by the author, supplemented with other pertinent scholarly 
insights. It offers a framework for analysis, complemented by the identi-
fication of a series of interrelated correlates relating to the ANC’s decline 
and its reversal. The correlates, on occasion fused across fronts but for 
analytical purposes viewed as external and internal, are manifested on 
four fronts: outwardly, these are the ANC’s hegemonic-struggle relations 
(1) with the state and (2) with the people – especially, in the latter case, 
4 Minimal hegemony means that a dominant group unites in aims and purpose 
irrespective of whether the subaltern groups follow (see Moore 1995). 
5 These values include the essence of humility and a selfless dedication to the 
interests of the people (ANC 2017b). 
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(3) through elections; inwardly, this refers to (4) the party’s battles for 
factional control over the organisation. The cut-off point of the analysis 
is April 2018, shortly after the ANC affirmed at its national elective con-
ference that it would work to reverse the preceding Zumaist tendencies.  
After the next section’s conceptualisation of hegemony and identifi-
cation of mid-level connotations linked to hegemony (such as consent 
without coercion, unthinking endorsement, widespread legitimacy), the 
rest of the article identifies concrete manifestations or correlates of he-
gemony at the operationalised level. This is executed along the dimen-
sions of the two interrelated internal–external struggles (across the four 
fronts that were identified) specific to the period from the second term 
of President Jacob Zuma into the first months of the incumbency of 
President Cyril Ramaphosa. 
Conceptualising and Attaching Correlates to 
ANC Hegemony
As Eagleton notes, Gramsci “normally uses the word hegemony to mean 
the ways in which a governing power wins consent to its rule from those 
it subjugates” (Eagleton 1991, with reference to Gramsci 1971: 112). 
Gramscian terms of coercion versus consent, the latter denoting hegem-
ony, hence inform the analysis. Hegemonic predominance by consent for 
Gramsci is a condition in which a fundamental class exercises a political, 
intellectual, and moral role of leadership that is held together by a com-
mon world view or organic ideology (see Ramos 1982). It is worth bear-
ing in mind that even in this condition force is never completely elimin-
ated (see Moore 2014). 
The most frequent interpretations of hegemony are in Gramscian 
(Gramsci 1971) or neo-Gramscian Marxist literature and, recently, in 
theorising international relations (Cox 1983; Gill 1990; Morton 2007). 
Up until Cox, hegemony was used in the local context; its use in interna-
tional relations was limited to “domination.” Hegemony is used widely in 
political studies but has not been systematically operationalised in rela-
tion to the political position of the ANC. Hence, in ways comparable to 
Spiezio’s “correlates of war” (1990), the study identifies correlates of the 
loss and provisional renewal of ANC hegemony. For example, it will 
argue that the incidence of ideological delegitimation, attempted sup-
pression of criticism, de facto creation of state capture–related disorgani-
sation in state administration, and corruption (as a co-optive measure) 
are inverse correlates of ANC hegemonic power. In comparison, the 
removal from power of a discredited president of party and state, steps 
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to clean up corruption-infested and often dysfunctional state institutions, 
and modestly restored public opinion ratings are correlates of potential 
hegemonic renewal. There is, however, nothing singular and simple in 
the relation between counter-hegemonic and pro-hegemonic indicators: 
some of the actions to renew hegemony (such as cutting the co-optive 
corruption link) could in turn elicit fractious intra-organisational effects. 
Gramsci’s notion of the historical bloc helps direct the analysis. His-
torical bloc denotes the historical congruence between material forces, 
ideologies, and institutions: forces that are politically organised around a 
set of hegemonic ideas that give strategic direction and coherence to the 
constituent elements (see Gill 2002: 58). The historical bloc’s “unity of 
struggles”6 (Jessop 1997: 6–7) forms the basis of consent to a particular 
socio-economic order, yet all elements of the historical bloc contain 
potential contradictions. Hence alliances and compromises between the 
elements are commonplace. 
The conceptualisation of hegemony factors into the effect of cor-
ruption. Corruption does not often register in the Gramscian schema 
(and mainstream corruption analysis rarely acknowledges Marxist ideas), 
but it constitutes an element of hegemony’s decline, lying somewhere 
between Gramsci’s binaries of consent and force. For Gramsci, corrup-
tion  
consists in procuring the demoralisation and paralysis of the an-
tagonist (or antagonists) by buying its leaders – either covertly, or, 
in cases of imminent danger, openly – in order to sow disarray and 
confusion in his ranks, [and it may cause] cracks [to open] up every-
where in the hegemonic apparatus. (Gramsci 1971: 248)  
Hence, the visible occurrence of corruption, evident in the ANC-con-
trolled South African government, fostered discontent and helped de-
plete hegemony. 
At this mid-level of theorisation, one can operationalise the concept 
of hegemony and in turn derive its correlates. In the context of the over-
arching theme of constructing and maintaining the consent of those who 
are governed, mid-level theoretical references to hegemony include: 
preponderance of power, with power enabling the dominant agency to 
shape the political system – or, in international relations terms, unipolari-
ty (Gilpin 1981) and the pervasiveness of power or its “total social au-
thority” (Hebdige 1979); agreement that stabilises particular social orders 
(Arrighi 1994); and power in underpinning stability (Keohane 1980).  
6 As opposed to the unity of social forces that constitutes the “hegemonic bloc” 
(see Gramsci 1971: 52). 
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These theoretical statements on the presence of hegemony in na-
tional-level politics help generate correlates for studying the hegemonic 
hold of a governing party like the ANC over society. They direct the 
investigation to explore whether the ANC holds unquestioned power, is 
accepted as being the voice of society, and is largely unchallenged in its 
exercise of power, in addition to whether its political presence consti-
tutes a stabilising force. These pointers also suggest the inverse condi-
tions of declining, absent, or under-repair hegemony of dominant libera-
tion-movement parties. As they recede from high levels of popular 
veneration and consent, they have often used manipulative, forceful, or 
outright violent ways to compensate for their loss of organic power, 
often leaning towards control through both the manipulation of people’s 
perceptions and the delegitimation of opposition (for applications, see 
Melber 2003: viii–xiii; Cammett 1967: 20). Authoritarianism enters as an 
antithesis to hegemony, a thesis that stands at the core of Southall’s 
(2013) analysis of southern African liberation movements turning into 
political parties. To illustrate the case of the ANC in South Africa, Ron-
nie Kasrils (2013) remarked specifically on the Protection of State In-
formation Bill (but with broader potential application) that “government 
administration was turning [the Bill] into a draconian instrument” of 
threat to freedom of expression and “alarm bells were sounded by con-
cerned civic society […] for the signs were of a slide to authoritarian-
ism.”  
Linz’s classic work (1964) further helps flag correlates of declining 
hegemony and assists in analysing the ANC’s hegemonic condition. He 
highlights constrained pluralism, suppression of political opponents, 
mobilisation under the banner of a threatened political class purporting 
to counter societal threats, and vague and frequently shifting parameters 
of executive power. His work confirms that in practice authoritarian and 
coercive acts are often easier to identify than consent. Furthermore, 
Nathan (2003) points out that authoritarian systems suffer from weak 
legitimacy, use of coercion, centralisation of decision making, and per-
sonal power that prevails over institutional norms. Salamini’s emphasis 
on the Gramscian differentiation between legitimacy, hegemony, and 
authoritarianism – in the context of defining conjunctural versus organic 
phenomena7 – helps illuminate the ANC balancing act of consent versus 
coercion:  
7 Saul and Gelb (1986) analysed the organic crisis of the National Party regime in 
Apartheid South Africa. 
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Conjunctural phenomena denote a momentary period of crisis 
which gives rise to a political strategy of limited political signifi-
cance, consisting of “minor political criticism” and always subject-
ed to political leaders with government responsibilities. Organic 
phenomena, in contrast, refer to a long-range strategy to restore 
the political and ideological hegemony within a given historical 
bloc. (Salamini 1981: 60) 
In this context, the ANC appears to be between conjunctural and organ-
ic crises: it is in a phase of declining hegemony that suggests a critical 
situation that has moved beyond Salamini’s idea of the “conjunctural” 
but is not yet “organic,” and might, with the 2017–2018 ANC interven-
tions, possibly be contained at the level of the conjunctural. The decline 
is playing out, triggered by some groupings and cultures in the ANC 
while other ANC agencies are attempting to return the organisation to 
legitimate popular roots: in this case, therefore, “opposition politics” also 
plays out within the organisation. The Zumaist ANC accused multiple 
agencies within and beyond the ANC who dared oppose the Zumaists of 
“regime change” intentions, state intelligence was manipulated, and law 
enforcement agencies were subjugated to veil factional misconduct. Op-
position to this factional ANC included a less-tainted, change-driven part 
of the ANC (victorious by a small margin in the December 2017 ANC 
leadership elections), broad civil society coalitions of opposition that 
included the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), the latter two focusing on state cor-
ruption and de facto collapse of core state institutions.  
Similarly, the decline of the ANC’s tripartite alliance with the SACP 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in the time 
of Zuma, in addition to the split of COSATU and the formation of the 
new South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU), indicate slip-
page of hegemony; the resuscitated SACP and COSATU’s endorsement 
of the post-Nasrec ANC in turn showed a potential advance to regain lost 
hegemony. The ANC’s Zumaist incumbents in the 2014–2017 period 
were trying to recast the crisis as not of their own making, while the 
Ramaphosaists (associated with victorious ANC candidate and new presi-
dent, Cyril Ramaphosa) projected their actions as redirecting and correct-
ing the distorted ANC, working towards resurrecting an alternative ANC 
and associated hegemony, in the mould (so they argued) of the Mandela 
ANC. 
The analysis of the ANC’s hegemonic base hence takes forward rele-
vant correlates that are supported theoretically. On the side of loss of 
hegemony, these correlates include coercion and suppression, ideological 
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construction and propaganda, reinvention of liberation identity, electoral 
decline, and strategic outmanoeuvring of opposition parties. On the 
opposing side, renewal of hegemony, there are several complex indica-
tors, such as ideological reclamation of earlier ANC roots; rebuilding an 
ANC organisational image of unity, radicalism (to satisfy growing masses 
of discontented voters), and anti-corruption; and minor interim rewards 
in the repressed economy and politics to affirm the leadership change 
away from the Zuma camp. The correlates can also be categorised 
broadly as those that affirm hegemony or indicate declining hegemony, 
and ones that attest to the ANC (as party organisation and as govern-
ment, often indistinguishable) fighting back against hegemonic decline. 
The Outward ANC Hegemonic Struggle 
The analysis of the outward ANC hegemonic struggle assesses select 
correlates of decline and renewal that have been manifested on the three 
outward fronts named above. The term external is used for conceptual 
purposes to help differentiate between the ANC’s internal organisational 
politics and the external front on which the organisation engages with 
people directly, through elections and via the state. All of the external 
struggles are also reflected in the internal hegemonic struggles.  
Popular Correlates of ANC Hegemonic Decline and 
Renewal  
Popular protest in South Africa is a key indicator of the state of ANC 
hegemony. Community protest – aimed at local, provincial, and/or na-
tional governments, their incumbents, and/or their performance – sug-
gests that acceptance of and satisfaction with ANC rule is in question. 
Alexander (2010) points out that protests in some instances assume 
insurrectionary dimensions. Community protest (frequently in response 
to services and government delivery on policy undertakings), however, is 
not necessarily an expression of failing legitimacy. For much of the first 
protest decade of 2005–2015, such protest coexisted with continuous 
pro-ANC voting (Booysen 2007; 2015): the same communities that pro-
tested against ANC local service delivery in ANC-controlled municipal 
councils again voted ANC come the next election. This relationship 
persisted but became diluted over time. Even when the ANC suffered 
setbacks in the 2016 local elections (Engel 2016), the turn to the opposi-
tion came only in modest measure from the areas inclined to protest 
(informal settlements and South Africa’s townships). We also know that 
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protest is used as a supplementary representational measure: the ANC is 
accepted as legitimate and well-meaning, but communities need to en-
sure the visibility of their demands amidst many competing demands for 
the time and resources of the busy ANC (or other party) government 
(Booysen 2013). 
Although also cyclical, popular or community protest grew as citi-
zens became less certain that elected representatives were being beckon-
ed by protest and fire (mostly of burning tyres on roads; Von Holdt et al. 
2011) to come and take care of their needs. Citizens increasingly doubted 
whether voting and electing representatives were going to bring better 
service. The lack of national economic performance that reduces income 
inequality (see Netshitenzhe 2014) is amongst the socio-economic trends 
that converged with urbanisation and growing discontent. As more evi-
dence of corruption, patronage, and pursuit of leadership self-interest 
solidified, disenchantment and citizen distrust in public institutions also 
advanced (see World Values Survey 2015; Harris 2017).  
By 2016, protest had started to reflect many of South Africa’s unre-
solved issues relating to structural and racial inequality. In times of high 
hegemony, the ANC managed to persuade people to trust that it was in 
the process of addressing such issues. In the time of declining hegem-
ony, though, the ANC worked to project the 1994 transition to democ-
racy as a severely flawed starting point, and citizens increasingly turned 
to alternative forms of expressing their frustrations and anger. The 
#FeesMustFall revolt of 2015–2017 (Nyamnjoh 2016; Booysen 2016a) 
and the xenophobic attacks of 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2018 were cases in 
point. By all indications, citizens had come to believe that the ANC gov-
ernment was still to be trusted more than party-political alternatives, but 
that citizens needed to supplement elections and representative democ-
racy through protest. Protest would have a better chance to succeed 
should it be violent and disruptive. Alexander et al. (2018) note not just a 
rising trend in the frequency of community protests, but also a tendency 
towards those protests being disorderly. Both student and service-
delivery protests became more destructive; xenophobic attacks were 
unequivocally violent. Arson was a form of cathartic, anti-systemic ex-
pression of unhappiness with service delivery or with any government 
performance. Train coaches, freight-carrying trucks, buses, municipal 
offices and a city hall, public libraries, police stations, and major universi-
ty buildings were destroyed. 
Besides the students, it was at first largely working-class, sub-work-
ing-class, and lower-middle-class citizens that turned to protest. Middle-
class civil society gradually joined and challenged multiple policies, in 
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both the formulation-adoption and implementation phases, and increas-
ingly also the incumbency of President Jacob Zuma. For example, auto-
mated freeway e-tolling in Gauteng province could not be implemented 
as intended, nuclear procurement policies were challenged and halted, 
and some state-security legislation was aborted (Booysen 2015). The 
Zuma/Gupta Must Fall8 civil society mobilisation of 2016–2017 was at 
first middle-class driven, targeted at abuses in public policy and state 
management. It targeted Zuma in the wake of the extended state capture 
and corruption scandals (see Gumede 2018). Multiple non-governmental 
organisations mobilised and spawned new issue-specific civil society 
organisations. The action assumed a multi-class and multi-race character 
(see Anciano 2013). The class configuration was evident in several in-
stances of internal ANC anger that turned into major and destructive 
public protests: the school-burning protests in the Vuwani district of 
Limpopo province (against municipal demarcation that would see local 
ANC leaders’ political power bases erode) and the City of Tshwane mu-
nicipal riots of 2016 (to get a specific ANC leader as the ANC’s mayoral 
candidate).  
The trends show how citizen protest diversified and came to sym-
bolise the ANC’s inability to rely on consent engendered by liberation 
history and formal government processes. For close to a decade, the 
ANC government’s authority was challenged to varying degrees. The 
ANC government could not enforce procedurally many aspects of its 
rule. Simultaneously, it limited itself in the amount of force used, espe-
cially in quelling local-level protests, for fear of fostering political aliena-
tion and defection to opposition parties. 
While destructive protests were anchored in discontent with poor 
delivery and social transformation, a growing culture of civil disobedi-
ence and lawlessness lubricated the protest wheels. Popular hopes reced-
ed that government would deliver in line with 1994 ideals and would 
“stop eating” in greed and self-enrichment (Mashele and Qobo 2017; 
Booysen 2013). Citizens did not disengage entirely from the political 
system, but supplemented the system stridently with direct and frequent-
ly violent-destructive protest. Crime (see Wiener 2018) and gender vio-
lence, along with vigilantism and community self-administration of jus-
tice thrived in conditions of ineffective and corrupted law enforcement 
through the formal channels of investigation and prosecution. 
8 With reference to a family with inordinate, proven influence over President 
Zuma (see Amabhungane 2017; Pauw 2017; PARI 2017). 
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Much of the mobilisation was possible because South African citi-
zens could exercise their constitutional right to protest (Constitution 
1996). Mobilisation for purposes such as pressure for Zuma to resign as 
president of South Africa was carried off with the support of select state 
institutions entrusted with political oversight functions, such as the Con-
stitutional Court, various divisions of the High Court, and the public 
protector (ombudsperson, at least for the incumbent term that ended in 
2016). Citizens, civil society, opposition parties, and parts of the ANC 
could turn to the Constitution and legal system when the ANC abrogated 
civil and administrative rights. Even if the ANC was not consistently 
sensitive to citizen demands, citizens could mobilise and get satisfaction 
through legal and ombudsperson results. At least parts of the system 
worked for them and thus helped to coalesce ANC power and hegemony. 
These select correlate details on the ANC’s standing in relation to 
one of the pillars of its hegemony thus reveals the strong but varying 
levels of discontent within the historical bloc. ANC hegemony is not 
entirely undermined; there are multiple indications of protesting citizens 
“working” to get the ear and amplified government attention of the 
ruling party, or to change the leadership of the party. The people target 
the ANC as government for delivery demands rather than engaging with 
the ANC as political organisation. The ANC leadership change of De-
cember 2017 helped the organisation to improve its credibility in gov-
ernment (see section on the state), and generated popular consent as 
evidenced through opinion polls (see section on elections), but at the 
level of protest it did not bring change; protest had become ingrained in 
repertoires of political action. Rather, as evident in protest action in the 
North West, Gauteng, and Western Cape provinces in the short-term 
post-Nasrec moment, community protesters joined ANC action to effect 
intra-ANC provincial leadership change, or escalated their demands to 
ensure they would not be left behind as the new ANC government takes 
hold. The protests illustrated that ANC hegemony had been dented, 
especially in the years of Zuma rule, yet the ANC had not lost its hege-
monic anchoring in the community. The struggles also revealed the var-
ied degrees and manifestations of consent. 
Electoral Correlates of ANC Hegemonic Decline and 
Renewal
Amongst the most graphic correlates of ANC hegemonic decline are 
those in electoral politics, in the form of both party support and party-
specific turnout. ANC-oriented citizens realise the incisiveness of elec-
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toral choices and follow a hierarchy once they start dissenting: withdraw-
ing or abstaining from voting (see Lodge 2004), only after that voting for 
an opposition party, and possibly returning to the ANC when their party 
of original choice “self-corrects” (see Davies 2017). One of the bases of 
electoral behaviour in South Africa, elections as a “racial census” (Ferree 
2006), helps inform these patterns: dissidence from the ANC, and the 
party’s significant loss of proportion of the vote over time (Schulz-Her-
zenberg 2014), occurred largely in the form of electoral migration by 
black South African voters. This migration might be of a temporary 
nature, should the ANC be deemed to be self-correcting and party polit-
ical alternatives, such as ANC split-off parties, not retain their allure. 
Several split-offs contributed to the ANC’s declining electoral he-
gemony. ANC internal fallout led to new opposition parties that diluted 
the ANC base (even though big proportions of these dissidents returned 
to the ANC over time). The split factor played out serially in three pre-
ceding national elections – in 1999 the United Democratic Movement 
first contested elections, followed by the Congress of the People in 2009, 
and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2014.  
In 2004, when the ANC was at its all-time electoral peak, there had 
not been an antecedent split. At first, post-2004, there were minor drops 
in successive election outcomes. The downward trend accelerated in the 
2014 national and provincial elections and dropped further in 2016. 
Electorally, however, the ANC only started slipping below the 50 per 
cent mark when in 2016 it was in a pincer grip between the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), which was growing incrementally from its right, and the 
EFF, encroaching from its left. Both opposition parties grew modestly, 
but the cumulative pressures alerted the ANC to the real possibility of 
future electoral losses. 
Nationally projected, the 2016 local election outcome delivered 
barely an outright majority to the ANC. The DA’s modest inroads of 
2016 into the black voter corps (Booysen 2016b) damaged the ANC, and 
the EFF captured votes that would otherwise have gone to the ANC; in 
addition, many previous ANC supporters chose to abstain rather than 
vote against the ANC. High across-race turnout from DA supporters 
facilitated the change.9  
By the time of the 2016 election, the pro-opposition drift had com-
bined with the ANC’s registered voter constituency’s low motivation to 
vote. There were 257 municipalities, and the ANC still won the vast 
9 The trends in this section build on detailed election results information, drilling 
down to electoral wards and voting districts, obtained by the author from the 
Electoral Commission website, <www.elections.org.za>.  
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majority, although with countrywide decline in margins of victory. This 
resulted in 27 hung councils, often in important metropolitan and urban 
centres.10 In a number of cases, control slipped into the hands of opposi-
tion party alliances or, short of formal alliances, to less formal anti-ANC 
cooperative arrangements (Booysen 2016b). In the key province of 
Gauteng, the ANC fell to below the 50 per cent level in two of the three 
metropolitan councils and some other urban councils. 
Public opinion polls – for example, those that depict the standing of 
the president of South Africa – illuminate the consequences of electoral 
decline for ANC hegemony. The president of South Africa is indirectly 
elected by members of Parliament, and the ANC’s candidate is its own 
party president – namely, the person who would have occupied the top 
position on the party’s proportional representation list. A substantial gap 
existed between president Zuma’s continuously declining and dismal 
public endorsements, on the one side, and the ANC’s still-high electoral 
support, on the other side, even at the moderated Zuma-era levels: Zu-
ma’s approval ratings were less than half of the ANC’s (TNS media 
statement 2017).11 ANC internal research in late 2016 suggested that in 
an election with Zuma or a Zuma associate as the top candidate, the 
ANC would fail to get an outright majority (see also ANC 2017a). A 
2017 Ipsos survey found that only 18 per cent of South African adults 
wanted Zuma to remain president, and that his approval rating had fallen 
to 2.8 out of 10, compared with the 6.7 and 8.7 for presidential predeces-
sors Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, at comparable points in their 
respective incumbencies (Harris 2017). 
Illustrating the trends in Gauteng, another poll inquired about the 
impact of the ANC leader on 2016 election outcomes. According to 
Everatt (2017), in the context of the ANC’s 11 per cent decline in Gau-
teng Province from 2009 to 2014, Zuma’s behaviour “had a direct and 
negative impact on the choices voters made” (respondents were asked 
about significant Zuma-related events in the run-up to the election). This 
would have negatively affected future electoral choices regarding the 
ANC (Everatt and Jennings 2017).  
10 Given the absence of outright majorities, and the fragility of opposition alli-
ances between ideologically and strategically diverse parties, several of these 
councils have subsequently changed power to different alliance formations, on 
occasion also turning power back to the ANC, in coalitions that had not been 
possible immediately after the election. 
11 Kantar-TNS conducted a mobile survey with a representative sample of 1,000 
South African adults, 1–3 April 2017. The distribution was representative in 
terms of race, age, gender, and province. 
 Hegemonic Struggles of the African National Congress 19 
These correlates of ANC electoral support reinforce that the ANC 
no longer had a compelling hold over voters, and that Zuma as president 
had exacerbated the decline. If this potential loss of electoral hegemony, 
however, was anchored so strongly in ANC leadership factors then the 
ANC’s December 2017 leadership exchange should have helped the 
party restore its electoral standing. Polling in February 2018, Citizen 
Surveys (2018) showed indeed notable improvements in public percep-
tions of ANC government performance. Ramaphosa’s approval rating 
was close to 60 per cent, compared with Zuma’s 24 per cent of late 2017. 
This poll, however, reflected citizen sentiments amidst national euphoria 
about the ANC leadership change and before criticisms of the slow pace 
of change in government, despite Ramaphosa assuming power, were 
reflected in the national mood. Zuma’s incumbency had affected ANC 
hegemony negatively, and while some of the ANC’s standing could be 
recovered, it is likely that there was also more lasting damage.  
There were ongoing and deep-cutting factional fractures in the 
ANC (see section on organisational correlates) that could still counteract, 
although probably not negate entirely, ANC electoral gains that were 
linked to Nasrec 2017. By early 2018 the ANC was also working to try to 
recapture the EFF organisationally, as well as the EFF support base. 
There was some rapprochement between Ramaphosa and EFF leader 
Julius Malema, and the post-Zuma ANC was positioning its ideological 
and policy base as the radical equal to the EFF. These were largely cases 
of strategically leveraged, or manufactured, consent that might no longer 
be evidence of generalised hegemony of the ruling party. Irrespective, it 
served to counter other political parties’ encroachment.  
The potential electoral support of the ANC was tentatively resusci-
tated in the period following leadership change and de facto regime 
change when Ramaphosa took over as president of the ANC and South 
Africa. This meant that despite earlier firm indications of withdrawal of 
consent and fracturing of the historical bloc that supported ANC he-
gemony, there was still a popular willingness – come the signals of 
change away from discredited leadership and corruption among the elite 
circle in ANC government – to revert to earlier positions of support. 
This was a pro-hegemonic signal for the ANC, as it provided evidence 
that no opposition party had succeeded in replacing the ANC hegemon-
ically. The sustainability of this trend, however, would be obtained only 
in the next national and provincial elections.12 
12 By May 2018 there was speculation that the ANC would bring forward the 
elections that were formally expected between May and August 2019. However, 
turmoil associated with factional contest within the ANC thwarted such plans. 
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Correlates of State-Institutional Decline and Renewal in 
ANC Hegemony 
For a long time, the ANC strived to be in total command of the South 
African state, understanding such control to be the final conquest of the 
status quo ante. When the ANC took power in the Western Cape prov-
ince (for a limited time, and via a 2000 floor-crossing deal with the old-
regime National Party) and finally in KwaZulu-Natal by outright provin-
cial majority in 2009 (following power sharing with the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, which the ANC then gradually eclipsed), the ANC interpreted 
these majorities as milestones that sealed its hegemony.  
The process of the party asserting itself over the state advanced into 
extensive party–state fusion nationally and across provinces (see 
Booysen 2015), with ANC cadres being deployed into public institutions 
as a reward for political loyalty. Under Zuma’s control, the fusion bol-
stered ANC-factional control. Control and capture (both Zuma being 
captured by his business associates, and the ANC-Zuma faction captur-
ing state institutions) closed the circle when they drained ANC hegem-
ony due to compromised capacity, diluted commitment to the public 
good, and imploding public perceptions of the goodwill of ANC leaders. 
Cadre protectionism for faction members lessened the ability of the state 
to perform in trust-earning ways: de facto immunity existed against sanc-
tion in cases of non-performance or mismanagement/abuse of public 
resources, both for personal gain and party-political patronage–loyalty 
networks (see Southall 2013). In the decade under Zuma as ANC leader 
(2007–2017; he ascended into the state presidency in 2009 and remained 
until February 2018), factional capture of state institutions also descend-
ed into capture by a Zumaist clique within the faction. The entire faction 
nevertheless remained loyal, also to try to ensure a faction-friendly transi-
tion upon the end of Zuma’s term, which would have been realised had 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma won the ANC presidency.  
Capture13 was a long-time concern in the ANC and Tripartite Alli-
ance, and the focus sharpened as Zuma’s links with the Gupta family, 
amongst others, started plaguing the ANC (see Amabhungane 2017). 
Earlier, the SACP had rallied against capitalist capture of the movement 
by the Black Economic Empowerment emerging business elite:  
13 Capture is summarised in the SACC report (2017) as “securing control over the 
state wealth through the capture of state-owned companies by chronically 
weakening their governance and structures. Also securing control over the 
country’s fiscal sovereignty.” 
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the post-1994 anti-communism has been informed by the new 
emergent class interests accompanied by very real prospects of us-
ing state power or accumulated dependent BEE capital to capture 
our movement. (SACP 2009)  
By explicating Zuma’s links to both state security apparatuses and the 
criminal underworld, the Pauw (2017) study confirmed the dispropor-
tionality of higher-end patronage and corruption, which was used to co-
opt and compromise a wide ANC circle. 
The range of state institutions that was implicated in capture and 
corruption under the rule of Zuma (see, for example, Outa 2017; PARI 
2017) indicates the scope of the ANC’s problem of retaining credibility 
and esteem in governance, and the extent of turnaround and clean-up 
that was required once Ramaphosa became president. In mutually weak-
ening formations and with implications for credibility and popular con-
sent, South Africa’s compromised state institutions in the time of Zuma 
extended across the following entities: 
 The presidency of South Africa, with multiple signals that the presi-
dent was influenced and co-opted by private interests – for example, 
the Gupta family (Myburgh 2017), the criminal underworld, and 
Russian president Vladimir Putin (Wa Afrika, Jika, and Skiti 2017; 
Pauw 2017) – both in terms of appointments and the subversion of 
policy decisions, including on nuclear procurement. Zuma’s cabinet 
came to be held to account only when there was slippage in personal 
loyalty and insufficient advancement of pro-Zuma interests. Public 
accountability faded and the president often acted as if he was com-
manding a presidential-personal parallel set of state operations.  
 Core state departments, especially those with decision-making power 
in mineral resources, mines, and energy. The range extended into 
the National Treasury, the South African Revenue Service, and the 
Public Investment Corporation. 
 State-owned enterprises, such as the electricity supply agency 
Eskom, Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa), supplier of 
defence products Denel, and South African Airways (SAA). These 
were exposed for deals in which, for example, Zuma- and Gupta-
linked companies drew inappropriate benefits. Successive ministers 
of public enterprises helped enable looting of state enterprises in fa-
vour of narrow private-business enclaves. The South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), especially until March 2017, en-
sured favourable coverage when required by President Zuma and 
his associates. 
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 The investigative and prosecutorial agencies, including the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation (Hawks), Special Investigating Unit (SIU), and the 
State Security Agency and Department of State Security, which 
helped leverage investigative silences and prosecutorial inaction 
where it was required to protect factional ANC insider groups.  
With the aid of these institutions, there was also extensive influence over 
ideas and the shaping of public narratives – for example, those that were 
conducted through the subsequently disgraced international public rela-
tions firm Bell Pottinger operating for the Zuma–Gupta network to try 
to ensure consciousness shifts amongst the South African people to-
wards narratives of “radical economic transformation” that were de-
signed to build a base for the continuation of the Zuma order of things. 
These campaigns were also intended to veil state capture and the benefits 
reaped by the then president and his associates in the name of the Zuma 
faction, who argued they were fighting a struggle to subvert “colonialist 
white minority capital.” These actions amounted to thought control and 
propagandist coercion, both of which run counter to organic consent. 
These state-institutional conditions under Zuma, argued a South 
African Council of Churches (SACC 2017) report, showed that “the 
problem is far greater than corruption, but [rather amounts to] organised 
chaos […], a systemic design of the madness that ills our governmental 
environment.” The control was achieved “through a power-elite that is 
pivoted around the President of the Republic that is systematically si-
phoning the assets of the State” and that relies on “parallel governance 
and decision-making structures that undermine the executive” (SACC 
2017). The capturist operations were used by the Zumaists in power in 
ways that affected state legitimacy. The Zuma government, according to 
the SACC (2017), seemed to be driven “to periodically raid the various 
attractive units of the State, of which a legitimate government should be 
steward […]. What we see persuades us that the present government has 
lost moral legitimacy.” 
Polls confirmed that citizens interpreted these institutional failures 
and attempted thought control in ways that relate to legitimacy and he-
gemony. The World Values Survey (2015, data generated in 2013 before 
the bulk of damaging revelations about the Zumaist state) reported de-
clining confidence in a cluster of public institutions that define the South 
African state (confirmed by the IJR poll of 2013). This survey showed 
that confidence in “the government” (47 per cent), police (45 per cent), 
and the courts (50 per cent) in 2013 were at their lowest since 1994. In 
the decade from 2003 to 2013, the IJR measurement of confidence in the 
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presidency and national and provincial government declined from 77 to 
55 per cent, 73 to 55 per cent, and 65 to 52 per cent, respectively. The 
overall trend was one of precipitous decline, even before the Zumaist 
problems peaked. 
Civil society mobilisation, along with opposition parties and legal in-
itiatives by a former public protector (Madonsela 2016), was society’s 
way of fighting back against state capture and the complicity of the gov-
erning party (see Ndjwili-Potele 2017). The range of High Courts and in 
the final instance the Constitutional Court judgements – such as ordering 
the president to implement the public protector’s recommendations and 
ruling that the 2007 arms deal charges against the president needed to be 
reinstated (by the National Prosecuting Authority) – increased the legiti-
macy of the legal and oversight parts of the state apparatuses in the eyes 
of citizens. The range of judgements also created openings for sections 
of the ANC to try to demonstrate that the Zumaist ANC was being 
challenged through a legal system that was respected, albeit also played, 
by the governing party. The response of the ANC’s Zumaists occurred 
under the pretence of defending the people against a superior (capitalist, 
Western) onslaught, so they argued, in which leaders such as Zuma and 
his post-Nasrec cronies who remained in positions of state power were 
being targeted. 
Upon Ramaphosa’s assumption of power in early 2018, the substan-
tial ANC government task of stopping the decline that affected the cred-
ibility, legitimacy and, in the end, hegemony of the ANC was begun 
immediately. Ramaphosa treaded with circumspection in the clean-up 
action, ensuring that he would act only with the consent of the top six 
ANC officials, then the ANC National Working Committee (NWC), and 
finally the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) before he took 
decisive steps. The same process was followed on, for example, reshuf-
fling his cabinet and removing from power both Zuma (January/Febru-
ary 2018) and the Zumaist premier of the North West Province, Supra 
Mahumapelo (April/May 2018). Ramaphosa exercised more of his im-
mediate presidential powers when he acted against corruption in state-
owned enterprises and prosecuting authorities (as illustrated in Kotzé 
2018; Southall 2018).  
This phase of clean-up executed by the Ramaphosaist ANC hence 
attempted to recover lost hegemony. The process revealed much about 
the complex hegemonic construct that prevailed in that conjuncture. The 
ANC had much popular consent in undertaking the clean-up actions and 
was impelled further by public protest – for example, against the North 
West premier, who was reluctant to move. It appeared that a fundamental 
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form of popular goodwill had persisted, indicating consent to continuous 
ANC incumbency in the state – even if this consent was in an unusual 
adversarial-cum-cooperative relationship to the ANC as organisation. 
The Inward ANC Hegemonic Struggle
The ANC’s outward hegemonic struggle – across the fronts of people’s 
direct action, people in elections, and state institutions as they impact the 
people – affects the organisation, in addition to the ANC as organisation 
also impacting the outward struggles. In terms of these interconnected 
relationships generally, great organisational operation will not only 
strengthen the ANC electorally and in relation to the people, but will also 
help foster well-performing state institutions. Inversely, a discredited or-
ganisation that is in command of government but which fails to govern 
well is unlikely to establish a hegemonic base. This section reviews key 
correlates of ANC hegemony organisationally, as affected by factionalism 
and leadership struggles, reflected in membership and subnational organi-
sation, followed by signals of contested and tentative hegemonic resurrec-
tion once Zuma was ousted. In line with Gramsci’s arguments on corrup-
tion (1971: 268), the section also considers how this phenomenon had 
helped organisational structures sustain a discredited president and how a 
straightforward anti-corruption conference resolution (ANC 2018: 21) 
placed the organisation on a trajectory towards possible renewal. 
ANC Organisational Correlates Signifying Hegemonic 
Decline and Its Tentative Reversal 
Periods of rapid decline in the post-1994 ANC have regularly material-
ised at moments of leadership succession: these periods concentrate 
organisational efforts to reposition, especially if there was preceding 
decay. At two such points, after the party’s Polokwane and Mangaung 
national elective conferences, factional disunity heightened and the ANC 
suffered split-off opposition parties. The remaining ANC increasingly 
lacked the ability to retain the organisation as a national political 
hegemon. In the run-up to the 2017 conference, the ANC suffered a 
president (Zuma) that was damaging the ANC (and state) but remained 
entrenched, in control of core state apparatuses.14 At the conference, he 
14 The ability of Zuma to remain in control of the ANC until late 2017, despite 
divisions in the National Executive Committee, in all ANC structures from 
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only narrowly missed his target of installing a Zuma sympathiser-succes-
sor. Out of the top six ANC positions, the Ramaphosa camp won the 
presidency, the national chairpersonship, and the position of treasurer-
general. The deputy president, David Mabuza, entered this camp upon a 
so-called “unity” deal that he and the treasurer had struck (Mashatile 
2018).15 All election victory margins at this top-six level were minimal 
and came to characterise the ANC in the subsequent transitional, post-
Nasrec period. Ramaphosa had a conference mandate to act on ANC 
state corruption and win the next national elections for the ANC, yet he 
had to act within the constraints of a majority of 179 ANC conference 
delegate votes out of the total delegate number of close to 4,731 (see 
ANC 2018: 2–10). If the losing, Zumaist faction was to be alienated, and 
possibly split from the ANC, the ANC would be unlikely to maintain an 
outright electoral majority in a next national election. The Ramaphosa 
victory – as important as it was for potential ANC credibility, popular 
consent, and reconstruction of hegemony – was therefore fragile, and 
Ramaphosa was compelled to balance unity with a tainted faction over 
outright moves to counter corruption.  
The ANC’s internal factional struggle for control over the organisa-
tion had manifested itself as a two-faction succession battle between the 
Zumaists (with Zuma associate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as candidate 
for the December 2017 ANC presidential elections) and Cyril Rama-
phosa (ANC deputy president, with his CR-17 campaign). The factions 
operated at three levels of organisation – the first was the immediately 
evident factions aligning with ANC leaders and candidates, the second 
was the overlay of these factions with patronage (determined in the first 
instance by state incumbency; see also Beresford 2014), and the third was 
factional placement to influence public discourses through state institu-
tions and state sanction. The factional battles were fought therefore on 
interconnected fronts that covered control over ANC structures, mass 
media, and popular narratives. 
Control over the ANC’s branches, regions, and provinces was a 
core aspect of Zumaist strategy to structure the outcome of the Nasrec 
elective conference. A Zumaist victory would have helped to limit reper-
                                                                                                    
branch, regional, and provincial structures to ANC caucuses in national and 
provincial governments, still remained to be fully investigated and explained. 
15 The deal, largely clandestine, was that Mashatile (ANC Gauteng leader) and 
Mabuza (Mpumalanga leader) would pool their provincial delegates and ensure 
respective elections as treasurer-general and deputy president in 2017, with the 
prospect of winning the respective positions of ANC deputy president and 
president in the 2022 ANC elections. 
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cussions for corruption and capture (see, for example, Chikane 2017; 
Mbeki 2017). Decisive criteria at the base were membership recruitment, 
branch formation (legal and legitimate, or manufactured for election 
purposes – several of these, mostly Zumaists, were subjected to court 
rulings against malpractice), and gatekeeping (exclusion of Rama-
phosaists) over participation in branch general meetings (and hence con-
trol over the election of delegates to represent the branch at national 
ANC elections). These battles continued beyond the Nasrec moment – 
given the bitterness and disappointment that nearly half of the ANC 
Nasrec delegates experienced. Many started repositioning with a view to 
regaining control over the ANC and deployment to high positions; some 
Nasrec losers schemed to force an early subsequent ANC elective meet-
ing and re-establish their faction. 
Beyond the internal instability of leadership battles, the ANC-fac-
tional control over the media and over narratives to promote and en-
trench ideological and corruption-veiling actions was at the core of the 
battle for the hearts, minds, and pockets of ANC Nasrec delegates. The 
pro-Zuma campaign featured prominently the feigned ideological reposi-
tioning of the (factional) ANC as a new radical presence that was, as 
argued, at long last going to execute colonial-white-capitalist conquest. 
The Ramaphosaists adopted the radical narrative that was incorporated 
at the mid-2017 ANC policy conference, but had action on corruption as 
its frontline. Hence both these campaigns promoted narratives that were 
to ensure popular appeal, and possibly hegemonic consent. The factions 
offered the choice between retaining constitutionalism and concerted 
implementation of policies (Ramaphosa camp) or fighting (white) mon-
opoly capital and its agents’ attacks (Dlamini-Zuma campaign). The 
Ramaphosa delegates prevailed. This delegate orientation was also re-
flected in the MarkData public opinion poll (September–November 
2017) in which large majorities of respondents across provinces stated 
their preference for business-friendly policies that would promote job 
creation, rather than taking jargonistic positions on “radical economic 
transformation.” 
The ANC in late 2017 was at a tipping point where coercive power 
was being incorporated by the Zumaists to retain control over the party. 
Factional control over state institutions tasked with security and intelli-
gence helped the Zuma camp to delegitimise opponents, hoping to turn 
ANC branches and delegates in support of a pro-Zuma outcome. 
Amongst others, state security was used to contain ANC top-level fallout 
against the Zuma campaign (SACC 2017; PARI et al. 2017). For example, 
a range of dual SACP–ANC members operating in the branches, local 
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candidates and councillors, and local municipal functionaries had been 
“dealt with” (killed or attacked) when they threatened to expose the 
factional abuse of state resources.  
One of the correlates of declining ANC hegemonic stature was its 
membership decline in the period since 2012, when massive mobilisation 
was effected in the run-up to the 2012 ANC centenary celebration; dur-
ing this time, the Zumaists tried to bolster the pro-Zuma provinces to 
help swell the number of delegates that would vote for Zuma at the 
Mangaung conference (Booysen 2015). By the time of the ANC National 
General Council (NGC) meeting of 2015, the figures revealed massive 
decline: to 767,970 (see also Butler 2015). In contrast with previous con-
ference practice, the ANC did not release updated membership figures at 
the time of the 2017 policy and elective conferences. Membership was 
reported to have increased to 980,000, although the ANC failed to sub-
stantiate the figure by means of its conventional provincial breakdowns.  
A further correlate to the ANC’s organisational hegemonic status 
was in the failing Tripartite Alliance with COSATU (after COSATU had 
already split in 2015 under pressure for its criticism of the ANC’s Zu-
maist leadership) and the SACP. Both the SACP and COSATU had been 
instrumental in bringing Zuma to power after their fallout with Mbeki. 
By 2017 the emaciated COSATU (purged of Zuma critics) had also 
turned on Zuma, barring him from COSATU events. The SACP turned 
similarly: by 2016–2017 it had become a fierce critic of Zuma and the 
corruption and mismanagement associated with the Zuma faction’s loot-
ing of state resources. In the final days of Zuma rule, the Tripartite Alli-
ance was practically dead. As soon as Ramaphosa was elected, alliance 
criticisms of the ANC nevertheless turned into endorsements and legiti-
mation.  
Despite the ideological face of factionalism in the ANC, the ideo-
logical orientations were elastic and subject to opportunistic alignment of 
ANC leaders. The base of these factions was, on the one hand, patron-
age and the opportunity to “drink from the trough” (Booysen 2015), 
followed by self-preservation through prevention of the scrutiny associ-
ated with the rise of competing factions. On the other hand, the Rama-
phosaist faction rose on the construct of eliminating corruption and 
rescued the ANC from popular-electoral disintegration (ANC 2018). 
Those ANC leaders in the Zuma faction who had no incriminating bag-
gage felt free to commence factional realignment.16 This was a “manu-
16 In the aftermath of the marginal Nasrec Ramaphosa victory, his faction incre-
mentally consolidated its comparative standing, bolstered by the ANC confer-
ence resolutions on the elimination of corruption: the top six split 4 to 2 in fa-
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factured” alliance of factions, however, which incorporated compro-
mised members of the Zuma alliance. As Southall (2018) notes, this 
construction might still hold negative implications in future. 
Concluding Analysis 
In his seminal Gramscian analysis, Perry Anderson (1976: 13) points to 
the loop relationship between civil hegemony, war of position, and unit-
ed front. These elements emerge strongly in the analysis of the internal 
contradictions and conflicts that characterise the ANC’s struggle to re-
tain and renew hegemony. The ANC historical bloc circa 2017–2018 
moved from crisis to strained renewal, as evidenced in the review of 
correlates across the four faces of ANC hegemony. The contradictions 
were the symptoms of the struggle, in effect, between two contending 
ANC hegemonies: the old Zumaist order that had become synonymous 
with corruption and the abuse of state power and that was trying to 
reinvent itself under the ideological mantle of radical economic trans-
formation, and the Ramaphosaist order that was trying to establish a new 
hegemony – namely, one of identifying with the ethos of the Nelson 
Mandela era (assumed to have been democratic-inspirational, non-cor-
rupted, and driven by ANC unity). The lines of division between the old 
and the new, however, were often blurred and contested. 
The ANC up to late 2017 had been building up to a point where 
four sets of correlates of hegemonic decline converged and delivered 
weakness. The analysis indicated that at that stage the ANC’s hegemonic 
power had receded substantially. Still re-elected nationally at a 62 per 
cent level in 2014 (yet with provincial weaknesses), the 2016 municipal 
elections and subsequent opinion polls suggested that the ANC would 
either slip below the 50 per cent mark of outright approval in future 
elections, or would retain a majoritarian edge only with great difficulty. 
Declining levels of trust in core ANC and state institutions supported 
this outlook. A wide range of protest forms, from lawless disregard for 
public order to civil society mobilisation against ANC leadership under-
scored the argument of the ANC’s volatile, demanding interface with its 
popular base. The ANC of 2018, after its December 2017 leadership 
change, had improved prospects for rebuilding a sound hegemonic base. 
                                                                                                    
vour of Ramaphosa; the NEC (estimated on the slate lists at Nasrec to have 
been roughly 42 to 38 at best in favour of Ramaphosa) started featuring strong-
er pro-Ramaphosa majorities; and subsequently the NWC, originally balanced 
slightly in favour of Ramaphosa, carried pro-Ramaphosa resolutions routinely. 
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The ANC organisationally was divided along deep factional lines. The 
factionalism affected the movement and also compromised the state: 
state institutions, as carriers of ANC organisational policy and govern-
ance, as well as state-related implementation, suffered in credibility and 
actual performance. The ANC’s citizen base expressed sentiments that 
testified to renewed goodwill, yet with governance and service-delivery 
demands attached. The demands were fair, but the volume was immense 
and could still make the ANC government stumble. The ANC, in its 
custodianship of the state, could no longer, as in earlier times (see Lodge 
1995), rely on citizens believing that the ANC just needed time to get 
government delivery projects on track.  
Hegemony presupposes that “account is taken of the interests and 
tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised” 
(Gramsci, quoted in Anderson 1976: 19). The new ANC hegemony that 
was emerging tentatively was building on the conscious social force of 
receptive popular sentiments. The competing countering forces, harking 
back to the Zuma period, appeared to be based, in contrast and predom-
inantly, in a party-elitist, patronage-driven leadership group who wanted 
to protect old patterns of patronage and corruption. In the period of 
analysis, this did not take hold, because it ran against the social forces 
pushing the ANC into self-renewal, fostering reinvented, minimal-cor-
ruption governance while working in close association with its popular 
base. This was reminiscent of the hegemony that was expected to have 
been created when Zuma assumed power in 2007–2009, when people 
and party cadres alike longed for a president that would show a connec-
tion to the citizenry. The people as a social force can be seen to have 
remained on this track, still looking for a new and potentially re-
reinvented ANC, to realise this organic connection. Contemporary South 
African opinion polls suggest that there is a unison of political and eco-
nomic aims to overcome the status quo ante of discredited ANC gov-
ernance, and this may be seen as a conscious social force that could help 
a reconstituted historical bloc to emerge, drawing on the economy and 
civil society. There are, however, still internal contradictions in this 
emergent historical bloc. Lack of congruence is evident in parts of the 
old that are refusing to die. 
The details in this analysis of the unfolding struggles between two 
hegemonies, showing themselves over the four fronts of people, state, 
elections, and the ANC organisationally, highlight the two ANC factions’ 
war of position. The new is still emerging ambiguously: while civil socie-
ty is supporting the emerging hegemony, it is the contests and organisa-
tional internal contradictions that are restraining the new order. 
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Kampf um die Vorherrschaft im ANC: Vom Missklang morbider 
Symptome zur angespannten Erneuerung 
 
Zusammenfassung: Betrachtet man den gegenwärtige Zustand des Afri-
kanischen Nationalkongresses (ANC) in Südafrika im Bezug auf Hegemo-
nie, Niedergang und potenzielle Erneuerung, zeigt sich eine Organisation, 
die dem tödlichen Verfall entgangen ist, aber im Jahr 2018 dafür kämpft, 
als vereinter Block die einstige hegemoniale Stellung wiederzuerlangen. Die 
Analyse umfasst die äußeren Beziehungen des ANC zur Bevölkerung, zum 
Staat und zu den Wahlen, aber auch seine interne Organisation. Der ANC 
hatte bis Ende des Jahres 2017 einen Machtverfall zu verzeichnen, der 
unumkehrbar schien. Vielfältige Symptome des hegemonialen Verfalls 
waren offensichtlich. Ende 2017 gelang ein Führungswechsel an der Spitze 
des ANC, der potenziell den Niedergang aufhalten und die hegemoniale 
Stellung des ANC wiederbeleben kann, auch wenn dies bestenfalls ein 
langfristiger und inkrementeller Prozess ist. Der Kampf verschiedener 
Fraktionen um Macht und Kontrolle über öffentliche Ressourcen spaltet 
die Partei noch immer. Die Anhänger des alten Status quo wehren sich 
während sich eine neue Ordnung herausschält. Der Artikel zeigt den Zu-
stand des ANC auf, der bald 25 Jahre an der Macht ist, indem er die Symp-
tome des Niedergangs und möglicher Umkehrungen zusammenführt. 
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